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The supplementary material consists of eight sections. Section S.1 provides the proof of
Lemma 4 on the probability that a significant fraction of top tier objects are assigned via
long cycles. Section S.2 proves Theorem 3 on the asymptotic inefficiency of DA. Section
S.3 gives the formal details on how Erdös-Renyi theorem can be used to achieve asymp-
totic stability and asymptotic efficiency and explain the drawbacks that the underlying
mechanism would have. Section S.4 provides the details of the completion of the proof
of Theorem 4. Section S.5 proves Theorem 5. In Section S.6, we analyze the generalized
version of DACB. We provide a proof of Theorem 6. We also state and prove a result
on incentives which is the analogous of Theorem 5 but for the extended DACB mecha-
nism. Section S.7 contains simulations of alternative algorithms including DACB based on
random preferences which confirm that our main results hold well beyond the setting we
study, and particular for market sizes that are quite moderate. Finally, Section S.8 provide
details of the NYC school choice procedures and the data, which would help the reader to
understand the calibration performed in the main text.
S.1 Proof of Lemma 4
The proof of Lemma 4 requires a deeper understanding of the random structure of TTC.
In the next section, we simply present the part of the results that are of direct use for the
proof of Lemma 4. The result on the random structure of TTC is stated without proof, its
proof can be found in Che and Tercieux (2015).
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We need to begin with some preliminary definitions and results from random graph/mapping
theory.
S.1.1 Preliminaries
To begin, recall that it is sufficient to consider the TTC assignment arising from the market
consisting of the agents I and the objects O1 in the top tier (recall that, irrespective of the
realizations of the idiosyncratic values, all agents prefer every object in O1 to any object
in O2). Hence, we shall simply consider an unbalanced market consisting of a set I of
agents and a set O of objects such that (1) the preferences of each side with respect to the
other side are drawn iid uniformly, and (2) n = |I| ≥ |O|.
Consider any two finite sets I and O, with cardinalities |I| = n, |O| = o. A bipartite
digraghG = (I×O,E) consists of vertices I andO on two separate sides and directed edges
E ⊂ (I×O)∪(O×I), comprising ordered pairs of the form (i, o) or (o, i) (corresponding to
edge originating from i and pointing to o and an edge from o to i, respectively). A rooted
tree is a bipartite digraph where all vertices have out-degree 1 except the root which has
out-degree 0.1 A rooted forest is a bipartite graph which consists of a collection of disjoint
rooted trees. A spanning rooted forest over I ∪O is a forest comprising vertices I ∪O.
From now on, a spanning forest will be understood as being over I ∪O.
Consider an arbitrary mapping, g : I → O and h : O → I, defined over our finite sets I
and O. Note that such a mapping naturally induces a bipartite digraph with vertices I ∪O
and directed edges with the number of outgoing edges equal to the number of vertices, one
for each vertex. In this digraph, i ∈ I points to g(i) ∈ O while o ∈ O points to h(o) ∈ I.
Such a mapping will be called a bipartite mapping. A cycle of a bipartite mapping is
a cycle in the induced bipartite digraph, namely, distinct vertices (i1, o1, ...., ik−1, ok−1, ik)
such that g(ij) = oj, h(oj) = ij+1, j = 1, ..., k− 1, ik = i1. A random bipartite mapping
selects a composite map h◦g uniformly from a setH×G = IO×OI of all bipartite mappings.
Note that a random bipartite mapping induces a random bipartite digraph consisting of
vertices I ∪ O and directed edges emanating from vertices, one for each vertex. We say
that a vertex in a digraph is cyclic if it is in a cycle of the digraph.
The following lemma states the number of cyclic vertices in a random bipartite digraph
induced by a random bipartite mapping.
Lemma S1. (Jaworski (1985), Corollary 3) The number q of the cyclic vertices in a
1Sometimes, a tree is defined as an acyclic undirected connected graph. In such a case, a tree is rooted
when we name one of its vertex a “root.” Starting from such a rooted tree, if all edges now have a direction
leading toward the root, then the out-degree of any vertex (except the root) is 1. So the two definitions
are actually equivalent.
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random bipartite digraph induced by a random bipartite mapping g : I → O and h : O → I







where (x)j := x(x− 1) · · · (x− j − 1).
The next theorem on the random structure of TTC proves crucial for the proof of
Lemma 4. Its proof is contained in Che and Tercieux (2015).
Theorem S1. Suppose any round of TTC begins with n agents and o objects remaining in
the market. Then, the probability that there are m ≤ min{o, n} agents assigned at the end













Thus, denoting ni and oi the number of individuals and objects remaining in the market at
any round i, the random sequence (ni, oi) is a Markov chain.
This theorem shows that the numbers of agents and objects that are assigned in each
round of TTC follow a simple Markov chain depending only on the numbers of agents and
objects at the beginning of that round. It also characterizes the probability structure of
the Markov chain. This theorem implies that there are no conditioning issues at least with
respect to the total numbers of agents and objects that are assigned in each round of TTC.
Namely, one does not need to keep track of the precise history leading up to a particular
economy at the beginning of a round, as far as the numbers of objects assigned in that round
is concerned. Obviously, this result is crucial in rendering Lemma 4 analytically provable.
However, this result alone is not sufficient. We still need to understand the number of
objects that are assigned via short versus long cycles in each round. Unfortunately, the
composition of cycles—long versus short—cleared in each round depends on the precise
history leading up to the economy at the beginning of that round. The next two sections
deal with this issue.
S.1.2 The Number of Objects Assigned via Short Cycles
We begin by noting that TTC induces a random sequence of spanning rooted forests.
Indeed, one could see the beginning of the first round of TTC as a situation where we have
the trivial forest consisting of |I| + |O| trees with isolated vertices. Within this step each
vertex in I will randomly point to a vertex in O and each vertex in O will randomly point to
a vertex in I. Note that once we delete the realized cycles, we again get a spanning rooted
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forest. So we can think again of the beginning of the second round of TTC as a situation
where we start with a spanning rooted forest where the agents and objects remaining from
the first round form this spanning rooted forest, where the roots consist of those agents and
objects that had pointed to the entities that were cleared via cycles. Here again objects
that are roots randomly point to a remaining individual and individuals that are roots
randomly point to a remaining object. Once cycles are cleared we again obtain a forest
and the process goes on like this.
Formally, the random sequence of forests, F1, F2, .... is defined as follows. First, we let
F1 be a trivial unique forest consisting of |I|+ |O| trees with isolated vertices, forming their
own roots. For any i = 2, ..., we first create a random directed edge from each root of Fi−1
to a vertex on the other side, and then delete the resulting cycles (these are the agents and
objects assigned in round i− 1) and Fi is defined to be the resulting rooted forest.
We begin with the following question: If round k of TTC begins with a rooted forest
F , what is the expected number of short-cycles that will form at the end of that round?
We will show that, irrespective of F , this expectation is bounded by 2. To show this, we
will make a couple of observations.
To begin, let nk be the cardinality of the set Ik of individuals in our forest F and let ok
be the cardinality of Ok, the set of F ’s objects. And, let A ⊂ Ik be the set of roots on the
individuals side of our given forest F and let B ⊂ Ok be the set of its roots on the objects
side. Their cardinalities are a and b, respectively.





. For any (i, o) ∈ (Ik\A) × B, the probability that (i, o) forms a short-cycle is
1
nk
if i points to o and 0 otherwise. Similarly, for (i, o) ∈ A × (Ok\B), the probability
that (i, o) forms a short-cycle is 1
ok
if o points to i and 0 otherwise. Finally, for any
(i, o) ∈ (Ik\A)× (Ok\B), the probability that (i, o) forms a short-cycle is 0 (by definition
of a forest, i and o cannot be pointing to each other in the forest F ). So, given the forest
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F , the expectation of the number Sk of short-cycles is
E [Sk|Fk = F ] = E
 ∑
(i,o)∈Ik×Ok



















































= 2− aok + bnk − ab
nkok
≤ 2.
Observe that since ok ≥ b, the above term is smaller than 2. Thus, as claimed, we
obtain the following result.2
Proposition S1. If TTC round k begins with any forest F ,
E [Sk |Fk = F ] ≤ 2.
Given that our upper bound holds for any forest F , we get the following corollary.
Corollary S1. For any round k of TTC, E [Sk] ≤ 2.
2Note that the bound is pretty tight: if the forest F has one root on each side and each node which
is not a root points to the (unique) root on the opposite side, the expected number of short-cycles given
F is 1nkok +
nk−1
nk
+ ok−1ok → 2 as nk, ok → ∞. Thus, the conditional expectation of sk is bounded by 2
and, asymptotically, this bound is tight. However, we can show, using a more involved computation, that
the unconditional expectation of sk is bounded by 1. The details of the computation are available upon
request.
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S.1.3 The Number of Objects Assigned via Long Cycles
Again consider the unbalanced market in which |I| ≥ |O|, and recall n := |I| and o := |O|.
The Markov property established in Theorem S1 means that the number of agents and
objects assigned in any TTC round depends only on the number of agents and objects that
round begins with, regardless of how many rounds preceded that round and what happened
in those rounds. Hence, the distribution of the (random) number Mk of objects that would
be assigned in any round of TTC that begins with nk agents and ok(≤ nk) objects is
the same as that in the first round of TTC when there are nk agents and ok(≤ nk). In
particular, we can apply Lemma S1 to compute its expected value:3








We can make two observations: First, the expected number is increasing in ok (and nk)
and goes to infinity as ok (and nk) increases. This can be seen easily by the fact that
k−l
k
is increasing in k for any k > l. Second, given our assumption that nk ≥ ok, there exists
ô ≥ 14 such that
E[Mk |ok ] ≥ 3 if ok ≥ ô.
We are now ready to present the main result. Recall that Ô is the (random) set of










Proof. Consider the following sequence of random variables {E(Lk |ok )}|O|k=1 where ok
is the number of remaining objects at round k while Lk is the number of objects assigned
at round k via long cycles. (Note both are random variables.) Thus, o1 = |O|. Note
that E(L|O|
∣∣o|O|) = 0. By Theorem S1, we are defining here the process {E(Lk |ok )}|O|k=1
induced by the Markov chain {ok}. Note also that E(Lk |ok ) = E[Mk |ok ]−E[Sk |ok ] where
Sk is the number of objects assigned at round k via short cycles. By Proposition S1,
E[Sk |F ] ≤ 2 for any possible forest F , this implies that E[Sk |ok ] ≤ 2. Hence, we obtain
that E(Lk |ok ) ≥ 3 − 2 = 1 if ok ≥ ô. (Recall that ô is defined such that ok ≥ ô implies
E[Mk |ok ] ≥ 3.) Let T be first round at which the E(Lk |ok ) becomes smaller than 1:
3The number is half of that stated in Lemma S1 since the number of agents cleared in any round is
precisely the half of the cyclic vertices in a random bipartite graph at the beginning of that round. Recall
also that, by definition of TTC, together with our assumption that o ≤ n, given the number of objects ok,
the number of individuals nk is totally determined and is equal to ok + n− o.
4One can check that ô = 13 works. In particular, if nk = ok, E[mk |ok ] ≥ 3 if and only if ok ≥ 13.
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formally, E(Lk |ok) ≤ 1 only if k ≥ T (this is well-defined since E(L|O|
∣∣o|O|) = 0). Note










































Pr{T = t}(t− 1)
= E[T ]− 1
where the last inequality holds by definition of the random variable T . Indeed, whenever
Pr{õk = o
∣∣T = t} > 0 (recall that k < t), E [Lk∣∣õk = o] ≥ 1 must hold.
Once we have reached round T under TTC, at most ô more short cycles can arise. Thus,
the expected number of short cycles must be smaller than 2E(T ) + ô. Indeed, the expected
number of short cycles is smaller than 2 times the expected number of rounds for TTC to
converge (recall that, by Corollary S1, the expected number of short cycles at each round
is at most two) which itself is smaller than 2E(T ) + ô. It follows that
2E[T ] + ô ≥ E[|O| − |Ô|].
Combining the above inequalities, we obtain that
E[|Ô|] ≥ 1
3
(|O| − ô+ 2) ,
from which the result follows. 
Lemma 4 is a direct corollary of Theorem S2.
S.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Since U(u01, 0) > U(u
0
2, 1)), all objects in O1 are assigned before any agent starts applying
to objects in O2. Hence, the assignment achieved by individuals assigned objects in O1 is
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the same as the one obtained when we run DA in the submarket with individuals in I and
objects in O1. The following lemma shows that the agents assigned objects in O1 suffer a
significant number of rejections before getting assigned. This result is obtained by Ashlagi,
Kanoria, and Leshno (2013) and by Ashlagi, Braverman, and Hassidim (2011). We provide
a much simpler direct proof for this result here.5
Lemma S2 (Welfare Loss under Unbalanced Market). Consider an unbalanced submar-
ket consisting of agents I and objects O1, where |I| − |O1| → n(1 − x1) as n → ∞.
Let I1 be the (random) set of agents who are assigned objects in O1, and let I
δ
1 := {i ∈
I1|i makes at least δn offers} be the subset of them who each suffer from more than δn re-
jections (before getting assigned objects in O1). Then, there exist γ, δ, υ, all strictly positive,








Proof. Without loss, we work with the McVitie and Wilson’s algorithm (which equiv-
alently implement DA). Consider the individual i = n at the last serial order, at the
beginning of step n. By that step, each object in O1 has surely received at least |I| − |O1|
offers. This is because at least |I| − |O1| − 1 preceding agents must be unassigned, so each
of them must have been rejected by all objects in O1 before the beginning of step n.
Each object receives offers randomly and selects its most preferred individual among
those who have made offers to that object. Since each object will have received at least
|I| − |O1| offers, its payoff must be at least max{η1,o, ...η|I|−|O1|,o}, i.e., the maximum of
|I| − |O1| random draws of its idiosyncratic payoffs. At the beginning of step n, agent n
makes an offer to an object o (i.e., his most favorite object which is drawn iid). Then, for
n to be accepted by o, it must be the case that ηi,o ≥ max{η1,o, ...η|I|−|O1|,o}. This occurs
with probability 1|I|−|O1| . Thus, the probability that n is assigned o is at most
1
|I|−|O1| .
























for any δ ∈ (0, x1), where Eδi denotes the event that i makes at least δn offers.
5The main case studied by Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno (2013) deals with the situation in which the
degree of unbalancedness is small; i.e., |I| − |O1| is sublinear in n. Our proof does not apply to that case.
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Let Fi := {i ∈ I1} denote the event that agent i is assigned an object in O1, and let
F ci := {i 6∈ I1} be its complementary event. Then, by ex ante symmetry of all agents,









+ Pr{F ci }Pr
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+ (1− x1) · 1 as n→∞,
where the last line obtains since, with probability going to one as n→ 1, an agent who is
















Observe that the RHS tends to a strictly positive number as δ → 0. Thus, for δ > 0 small




is bounded below by some positive
constant for all n large enough.













































for all n > N for some N > 0, since |I1||I| → x1 as n→∞. The claimed result then follows.

Lemma S2 implies that there exists ε′ > 0, υ′ > 0, γ′ > 0 such that for all n > N ′ for








where Ĩε′ := {i ∈ I|DA(i) ∈ O1, Ui(DA(i)) ≤ U(u1, 1− ε′)} is the set of agents assigned to
objects in O1 but receive payoffs bounded above by U(u1, 1− ε′).
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Now consider a matching mechanism µ that first runs DA and then runs a Shapley-
Scarf TTC afterwards, namely the TTC with the DA assignments serving as the initial
endowments for the agents. This mechanism µ clearly Pareto dominates DA. In particular,
if DA(i) ∈ O1, then µ(i) ∈ O1. For any ε′′, let
Ǐε′′ := {i ∈ I|µ(i) ∈ O1, Ui(DA(i)) ≥ U(u1, 1− ε′′)},
be those agents who attain at least U(u1, 1 − ε′′) from µ. By Lemma 1, we have for any








for all n > N ′′ for some N ′′ > 0.
Now set ε′, ε′′ such that ε = ε′ − ε′′ > 0, γ′, γ′′ such that γ := γ′ − γ′′ > 0, and υ′, υ′′
such that υ := υ′ − υ′′ > 0. Observe that Iε(µ|DA) ⊃ Ĩε′ \ Ǐε′′ , so |Iε(µ|DA)| ≥ |Ĩε′ | − |Ǐε′′ |.





































≥ υ′ − υ = υ.
S.3 The Erdös-Renyi mechanim
We first briefly recall the Erdös-Renyi theorem mentioned in the paper. It is thus worth
introducing the relevant model of random graph. A bipartite graph G consists in vertices,
V1 ∪ V2, and edges E ⊂ V1 × V2 across V1 and V2 (with no possible edges within vertices
in each side). A perfect bipartite matching is a bipartite graph in which each vertex is
involved in exactly one edge. A random bipartite graph B = (V1 ∪ V2, p), p ∈ (0, 1), is a
bipartite graph with vertices V1 ∪ V2 in which each pair (v1, v2) ∈ V1 × V2 is linked by an
edge with probability p independently (of edges created for all other pairs). In this context,
the Erdös-Renyi theorem can be stated as follows.
Theorem S3. Consider a random bipartite graph B = (V1 ∪ V2, p) where 0 < p < 1 is a
constant and for each i ∈ {1, 2} and |V1| = |V2| = n. We have
Pr [∃ a perfect bipartite matching ]→ 1 as n→∞.
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Hence, in our environment where we draw randomly individuals’ preferences and ob-
jects’ priorities, one can build an associated random bipartite graph which consists of
vertices I ∪ O and where an edge between (i, o) is added if and only if ξi,o > 1 − ε and
ηi,o > 1− ε. Applying the Erdös-Renyi theorem we obtain that with probability approach-
ing 1 as |I| = |O| = n increases, a (perfect bipartite) matching exists where all objects
and agents realize idiosyncratic payoffs greater than 1 − ε.6 Hence, one could construct
a mechanism in which (1) agents and objects (more precisely their suppliers) report their
idiosyncratic shocks (2) given such a reports a bipartite graph is built where an edge be-
tween an agent and an object if and only if ξi,o > 1− ε and ηi,o > 1− ε and (3) a maximal
bipartite matching is selected.7 Such mechanism would select a perfect matching when-
ever it exists. Under truthful reports, this occurs with probability approaching 1 as the
market size increases. Thus, by construction, this mechanism is asymptotically efficient
and asymptotically stable. In addition, well-known polynomials algorithms such as the
augmenting path algorithm would find a maximal matching.
However, as stated in the paper, this mechanism would not be desirable for several
reasons. First, it would not work if the agents cannot tell apart common values from
idiosyncratic values. More importantly, the mechanism would not have a good incentive
property. An agent will be reluctant to report the objects in lower tiers even though they
have high idiosyncratic preferences. Indeed, if he expects that with significant probability,
he will not get any object in the highest tier, he will have incentives to claim that he
enjoys high idiosyncratic payoffs with a large number of high tier objects and that all his
idiosyncratic payoffs for the other tiers are low. It is very likely that there is a perfect
matching even under this misreport and this will ensure him to get matched with a high
tier object.
S.4 Completion of the Proof of Theorem 4
We start by showing that DACB with κ ≥ log2(n) and κ = o(n) is asymptotically efficient.






where we recall that Iε(µ
′ |µ) := {i ∈ I |U(µ(i)) < U(µ′(i))− ε}.
We first introduce some notations: In the sequel, for an arbitrary collection of sets
{Xk}Kk=1, we let X<k (resp. X≤k) be the set ∪`<kXk (resp. ∪`≤kXk). Note that X<1 = ∅.
6The unbalanced case can be treated with almost no modifications.
7A maximal bipartite matching is a matching that contains the largest possible number of edges.
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We fix any mechanism µ′ that weakly Pareto-dominates µ and any ε > 0 small enough so
that U(uk, 1)− ε > U(uk+1, 1) for all k = 1, ..., K − 1.
Now, fix k ≥ 1 and let I ′k := {i ∈ I|µ(i) ∈ Ok} be the set of individuals matched to
objects in Ok under matching µ
′ and recall that Ik is the set of individuals matched to
objects in Ok under matching µ. By definition, |I ′<k| = |I<k|. Let
Īk := {i ∈ Ik |U(µ(i)) ≥ U(uk, 1)− ε} and Îε,k(µ′ |µ) := {i ∈ Ik |U(µ(i)) ≥ U(µ′(i))− ε}.
Then, for any i ∈ Īk\I ′<k, U(µ(i)) ≥ U(uk, 1) − ε ≥ U(µ′(i)) − ε. Hence, we must have
Īk\I ′<k ⊂ Îε,k(µ′ |µ). Observe next Ī<k ⊂ I ′<k. This follows since, if i ∈ Ī<k (note that this
implies k ≥ 2), then by definition U(µ′(i)) ≥ U(µ(i)) ≥ U(uk−1, 1) − ε > U(uk, 1) and so
i ∈ I ′<k.




















































































≥ γ′ + δ and
∣∣Ī<k∣∣
|I<k|




where the second equality holds since Īk ∩ Ī<k = ∅, which implies Īk\(I ′<k ∩ Ī<k) = Īk;
the third equality holds since Ī<k ⊂ I ′<k; the last equality uses |I ′<k| = |I<k|; and the
convergence result follows from Proposition 1.














































as n→∞, where the second inequality uses the union bound, and the convergence follows









where we recall that Jε(µ) := {(i, o) ∈ I ×O |Ui(o) > Ui(µ(i)) + ε and Vo(i) > Vo(µ(o)) + ε}.




























































as n → ∞, where the last inequality is by the union bound while the convergence result
holds by Proposition 1.
S.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Let f : I → {1, . . . , n} denote the serial orders for the agents. Recall by the basic uncer-
tainty assumption, the distribution of the serial orders is such that for each agent i and
any ` = 1, . . . , n, Pr{f(i) = `} goes to 0 as n goes to infinity.
Let us fix ε > 0 and k = 1, ..., K. Assume that f gives to agent i a serial order in
{|O≤k−1|+2, ..., |O≤k|} with the convention that |O≤0|+2 = 1. We show that there is N ≥ 1
such that for any n ≥ N , for any vector of cardinal utilities (ûo)o∈O := (Ui(uo, ξio))o∈O, i
cannot gain more than ε by deviating given that everyone else reports truthfully. As will
be clear, the argument does not depend on the specific serial order of i within {|O≤k−1|+
2, ..., |O≤k|} and since there are finitely many tiers, N can be taken to be uniform across
all individuals with serial order in ∪Kk=1{|O≤k−1| + 2, ..., |O≤k|}. Hence, conditional on the
event that i’s serial order is in {|O≤k−1| + 2, ..., |O≤k|} for some k = 1, ..., K, it will follow
that for any n ≥ N , for any vector of cardinal utilities, i cannot gain more than ε by
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deviating given that everyone else reports truthfully. Now, by assumption, the probability
of the event that i’s serial order is in {|O≤k−1| + 2, ..., |O≤k|} for some k = 1, ..., K tends
to 1 as n goes to infinity and so even without conditioning, i cannot gain more than ε by
deviating given that everyone else reports truthfully.
Before starting the proof of Theorem 5, we state the following lemma.
Lemma S3. Let us assume that κ(n) ≥ log2(n) and κ(n) = o(n) and consider DACB
mechanism where all agents report truthfully. Fix any k = 1, . . . , K and any agent i with a
serial order in {|O≤k−1|+2, ..., |O≤k|}. Assuming all agents report truthfully, the probability
that i is matched at Stage k converges to 1 as n goes to infinity.
Proof. By the argument in the proof of Proposition 1, we know that with probability
approaching 1 as n goes to infinity, Step |O≤k| ends under DACB and, for any agent i with
a serial order in {|O≤k−1| + 2, ..., |O≤k|}, the outcome of DACB at the end of that step
coincides with that of DA in the submarket composed only of individuals with serial orders
in {|O≤k−1|+ 2, ..., |O≤k|} together with the individual who was rejected at the last step of
Stage k− 1 (if k ≥ 2) and only of objects in Ok. Since the outcome of DA does not depend
on the specific serial order used, under the event that the outcome of DACB at the end of
Step |O≤k| coincide with that of DA in that submarket, if we permute the ordering of agents
with serial orders in {|O≤k−1| + 2, ..., |O≤k|} the outcome of DACB at Step |O≤k| remains
the same and so the final outcome of DACB remains the same. Thus, conditional on this
event, for each agent with a serial order in {|O≤k−1| + 2, ..., |O≤k|}, the probability of not
being matched by the end of Stage k is the same. Hence, since the number of such agents
goes to infinity as n grows, this probability must go to 0 as n goes to infinity. Since the
conditional event has a probability converging to 1 as n goes to infinity, (unconditionally)
the probability of not being matched by the end of Stage k must go to 0 as n goes to
infinity. 
In the sequel, we assume that all individuals other than i report truthfully their prefer-
ences. We partition the set of possible reports into two sets T1 and T2 as follows. T1 consists
of the set of reports that, when restricted to objects in O≥k, only contain objects in Ok
within the κ first objects. T2 consists of the set of reports which, when restricted to objects
in O≥k contain some object outside Ok within the κ first objects.
We will be using the following terminology: Fix a set of possible reports T . Given
an event EPi which may depend on i’s report Pi, we will say that the probability of EPi
converges to 1 uniformly across all reports in T if for any ε > 0, there is N such that for
any n ≥ N , Pr(EPi) ≥ 1− ε for any report Pi in T .
Recall that i’s serial order is in {|O≤k−1| + 2, ..., |O≤k|}. In the sequel, given agent i’s
report, we define p(r) to be the probability of obtaining the r-th ranked object within the
O≥k objects (we abuse notations and forget about the dependence of p(r) on i’s report).
15
Lemma S4. If i’s report is of type T1, then
∑κ
r=1 p(r) converges to 1. In addition, the
convergence is uniform across all possible reports in T1. If i’s report is of type T2, then∑`
r=1 p(r) converges to 1 where ` ≤ κ is the rank (within the O≥k objects) of the first object
outside Ok. In addition, the convergence is uniform across all possible reports in T2.8
Proof. Consider E the event under which, independently of i’s reported preferences,
provided that all individuals from 1 to |O≤k−1|+ 1 report truthfully their preferences over
objects in O≤k−1, for each k
′ = 1, ..., k−1, the objects assigned in stage k′ are exactly those
in Ok′ . By our argument in the proof of Proposition 1, the probability of that event tends
to 1. By construction, the convergence is uniform over all of i’s possible reports. From
now on, let us condition on the realization of event E . By Lemma S3, we know that with
(conditional) probability going to 1, i is matched within Stage k.9 In addition, by ex ante
symmetry of objects within a given tier (given our conditioning event E , the way i ranks
objects in O≤k−1 does not matter), the rate at which the conditional probability goes to
1 is the same for each report in T1. But given that Pr(E) goes to 1 uniformly across all
possible i’s reports, the unconditional probability that i is matched within Stage k also
converges to 1 uniformly across these reports. This proves the first part of the lemma.
Now, we move to the proof of the second part of the lemma. Let us consider the event
that for each k′ = 1, ..., K, all individuals other than i only rank objects in Ok′ within their
κ most favorite objects in O≥k′ . Consider as well event E as defined above and let F be
the intersection of these two events. By Lemma 3-(ii) as well as Proposition 1, we know
that Pr(F) goes to 1 as n goes to infinity. By construction, the convergence is uniform
over all of i’s possible reports. Note that under event F no individual other than i will
make an offer to an object outside Ok within Stage k. In addition, under F , the probability
that i is matched in Stage k goes to 1 as n goes to infinity uniformly across any report of
i in T2.10 Combining these observations, it must be the case that the probability that “i
8More precisely, we mean that for any ε > 0, there is N such that for any n ≥ N ,
∑`
r=1 p(r) ≥ 1 − ε
for any ` ≤ κ and for any report of i which, restricted to objects in O≥k contains an object outside Ok at
rank ` (where the rank is within objects in O≥k).
9The only difference with Lemma S3 is that i’s report on his preferences may not be truthful and so
cannot be considered to be drawn randomly. However, it should be clear that the argument goes through
as long as i’s report is independent of his opponents’ preferences which must be true in the environment
we are considering where types are drawn independently and so where players play independently. That
the conditional probability of the event “i is matched within Stage k” tends to 1 comes from the facts that
the unconditional probability of the event tends to 1 and that the conditioning event E has a probability
which tends to 1.
10Indeed, the probability that i gets matched in Stage k under a report in T2 is larger than the probability
that i gets matched in Stage k under the report where within the κ first objects in O≥k, any object outside
Ok is replaced by an object in Ok. To see this, let ` be the rank (within O≥k) of the first object outside
Ok under the original report. Observe that under F , i cannot get matched to an object in a tier k′ < k.
16
is matched to the object outside Ok with rank ` or to a better-ranked object” converges
to 1 uniformly across all possible i’ reports in T2. In addition, we know that, under F , i
can only be matched to an object in O≥k, hence, we get that conditional on F ,
∑`
r=1 p(r)
converges to 1 uniformly across i’s possible reports. Given that Pr(F) goes to 1 uniformly
across all possible i’s reports, this statement holds for unconditional probabilities as well,
as was to be shown. 
Since T1 and T2 cover the set of all possible reports of individual i, we get
Corollary S2. For any i’s report, we have that
∑κ
r=1 p(r) converges to 1. Convergence is
uniform across all of i’s reports.
In the sequel, we condition on event E defined in the proof of the above lemma, i.e.,
the event that, irrespective of i’s reported preferences, all objects in O≤k−1 are gone when
Stage k starts. As we already said, the probability of E converges to 1 uniformly across
all possible i’s reports. Now, we fix a type (ûo)o∈O := (Ui(uo, ξio))o∈O of individual i and
consider two cases depending on whether his true preference order falls into T1 or T2.
Case 1: Assume that individual i’s true preference order falls into T1. Clearly, the ex-
pected utility of telling the truth is higher than
∑κ
r=1 pT (r)ûr where pT (r) is the probability
of getting the r-th best ranked object within the O≥k objects (and hence within the Ok
objects since i’s type falls into T1) when reporting truthfully and ûr is i’s utility for the
object with rank r within the O≥k. By the above lemma, if i reports truthfully, then with
probability going to 1 as n goes to infinity, he gets one of his κ most favorite objects within
O≥k, thus, for some N1 ≥ 1, and for all n ≥ N1,
∑κ




Let us consider a lie of individual i. Given our conditioning event, what matters are
the reports within objects in O≥k. In addition, given the symmetry of objects within each
tier, it is optimal, and thus we assume, that agent i orders the objects within each tier
truthfully among them.11 Thus, we can restrict attention to a lie in which an agent lists
truthfully objects in Ok for ranks 1 to `− 1 and lists an object in O>k for rank `, for some
` (the ranks here are that within O≥k objects). Clearly, if ` > κ then, by the previous
lemma, irrespective of the exact form of the lie, for n large enough, the lie cannot benefit
agent i by more than ε. Thus, we assume without loss that ` ≤ κ. By definition of DACB,
In addition, if under the modified report, i gets matched to an object with a rank (within O≥k) strictly
smaller than ` then, by definition of DACB, i will obtain the same match under the original report. Now,
if i gets matched to an object with a rank (within O≥k) larger than ` then, under the original report, i
applies to an object in O>k and so, under F , by definition of DACB, i gets matched to that object. Since
the modified report is in T1, and, as we already showed, the probability that i is matched in Stage k goes
to 1 as n goes to infinity uniformly across any report of i in T1, this completes our argument.
11That is, for any object o and o′ which both belong to the same tier k, if i prefers o to o′ then i ranks
o ahead of o′.
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for each r = 1, ..., `− 1 individual i still has probability pT (r) to get the object with rank
r under the false report. But now he has probability pL(`) to get matched to the object in
O>k. Now, recall that for all n ≥ N1,
∑κ
r=1 pT (r) +
ε
2U(1,1)
≥ 1. This implies that for all
n ≥ N1,
∑κ





r=1 pT (r) + pL(`) and so
∑κ




addition, we know by the above lemma that
∑`−1
r=1 pT (r) + pL(`) converges to 1 uniformly
across all possible deviations of individual i. Since, given our conditioning event, i has
zero probability to get an object in O≤k−1, there must exist some N2 ≥ 1 so that for all
n ≥ N2, i’s expected payoff when he lies is smaller than
∑`−1




û∗ is the utility for agent i of the best object in O>k. Clearly, û∗ < ûr for each r = 1, ..., κ
(recall that i’s type falls into T1). In the sequel, we fix n ≥ max{N1, N2}. We obtain that,
conditional on E , the expected payoff when lying is smaller than
`−1∑
r=1




























pT (r)ûr + ε






The second inequality holds since û∗ ≤ U(1, 1). The last inequality holds because û∗ < ûr
for each r = 1, ..., κ. Since the expected payoff of the truth is larger than
∑κ
r=1 pT (r)ûr,
we conclude that, conditional on E , lying cannot make i gain more than ε whenever n ≥
max{N1, N2}.12 Since E has a probability going to 1 uniformly across all possible deviations
of individual i, a same result holds for unconditional expected payoffs.
Case 2: Assume that individual i has a type which falls into T2. Consider the κ best
objects in O≥k and let R be the rank (here again, the rank is taken among O≥k objects)
of the best object in O>k. Clearly, the expected utility of truth-telling is higher than∑R
r=1 pT (r)ûr where pT (r) is the probability of getting object with rank r within the O≥k
objects when reporting truthfully. By the above lemma, if i reports truthfully, then with
probability going to 1 as n → ∞, i gets one of his R most favorite objects within O≥k.
Thus, for some N1 ≥ 1, and for all n ≥ N1,
∑R




Let us consider a lie by individual i. Given our conditioning event, what matters are
the reports within objects in O≥k. In addition, given the symmetry of objects within
each tier, we can assume without loss of generality that agent i orders the objects within
12Notice that by the uniform convergence result in the above lemma, N1 and N2 are independent on i’s
specific report.
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each tier truthfully among them. Let us first consider a lie where the first object in O>k
is ranked at R′ < R (here again, the rankings are those within O≥k). Thus, one can
think of such a lie as a report in which for ranks from rank 1 to rank R′ − 1 (the rank
here is that within O≥k objects) the agent lists truthfully among objects in Ok and for
rank R′, the agent lists an object in O>k. In that case, by definition of DACB, for each
r = 1, ..., R′ − 1 individual i still has probability pT (r) to get the object with rank r. But
now he has probability pL(R
′) to get matched to the object in O>k listed at rank R
′. Now,
recall that for all n ≥ N1,
∑R
r=1 pT (r) +
ε
2U(1,1)
≥ 1. This implies that for all n ≥ N1,∑R





r=1 pT (r) + pL(R
′) and so
∑R




addition, we know by the above lemma that
∑R′−1
r=1 pT (r)+pL(R
′) converges to 1 uniformly
across all possible deviations of individual i. Since, given our conditioning event, i has zero
probability to get an object in O≤k−1, there must exist some N2 ≥ 1 so that for all n ≥ N2,
i’s expected payoff when he lies is smaller than
∑R′−1





is the utility of the object in O>k listed for rank R
′ and so must satisfy û∗ ≤ ûr for each
r = 1, ..., R. In the sequel, we fix n ≥ max{N1, N2}. We obtain that, conditional on E , the
expected payoff when lying is smaller than
R′−1∑
r=1





























pT (r)ûr + ε
where the first inequality uses the fact that n ≥ N1 which implies
∑R





′). The second inequality holds since û∗ ≤ U(1, 1). The last inequality holds be-
cause û∗ ≤ ûr for each r = 1, ..., R. Since the expected payoff of the truth is larger than∑R
r=1 pT (r)ûr, we conclude that, conditional on E , lying cannot benefit agent i by more
than ε whenever n ≥ max{N1, N2}. Since, as n increases, the probability of E converges to
1 uniformly across all possible deviations of individual i, the same result holds for uncon-
ditional expected payoffs.
Consider next a lie which lists the best object in O>k for rank R
′ ≥ R (recall that the
rankings are those within O≥k). Here again, without loss of generality, one can think of
such a lie as a report in which for ranks 1 to R − 1 (the rank here is that within O≥k
objects) the agent lists truthfully among objects in Ok. In that case, by definition of
DACB, for each r = 1, ..., R − 1 individual i still has probability pT (r) to get the object
with rank r. But now he has probability pL(r) to get matched to the object with rank
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r for each r = R, ..., R′. Now, recall that for all n ≥ N1,
∑R




implies that for all n ≥ N1,
∑R−1













r=R pL(r). In addition, we know by the above lemma that
∑R−1
r=1 pT (r)+∑R′
r=R pL(r) converges to 1 uniformly across all possible deviations of individual i. Since,
given our conditioning event, i has zero probability to get an object in O≤k−1, there must
exist some N2 ≥ 1 so that for all n ≥ N2, i’s expected payoff when he lies is less than∑R−1





, where v̂r ≤ ûR for each r = R, ..., R′. In the sequel, we






























pT (r)ûr + pT (R)ûR + ε
where the first inequality uses the fact that ûR ≥ v̂r for all r = R, ..., R′. The second
inequality uses the fact that n ≥ N1 which implies
∑R′




last inequality follows from the fact that ûR ≤ U(1, 1). Since the expected payoff of the
truth is larger than
∑R
r=1 pT (r)ûr, we conclude that, conditional on E , lying cannot make
i gain more than ε whenever n ≥ max{N1, N2}. Since, as n increases, the probability of E
converges to 1 uniformly across all possible deviations of individual i, a same result holds
for unconditional expected payoffs.
S.6 Analysis of the Extended DACB Algorithm
S.6.1 Proof of Theorem 6
The following lemma will be instrumental for the proof and is inspired from an observation
by Wilson (1972) that in the environment where preferences are uncorrelated, priorities are
arbitrary and the market is balanced, a modification of the DA algorithm can be studied as
a standard urn model.13 Using this analogy Wilson (1972) shows that the expected total
13Wilson (1972) shows that in this environment, assuming individuals are memoryless, the number of
offers needed for all objects to be matched is equivalent to the number of trials needed to collect all n
coupons in the Coupon Collector Problem (in this problem, coupons are being collected, equally likely,
within an urn of n different coupons).
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number of offers made by individuals under DA is smaller n log(n). We strengthen this
result by proving a concentration result.
Lemma S5. Consider any arbitrary objects’ priorities. In the case individuals’ preferences
are uncorrelated (i.e., where Ui(o) = ξi,o for all i,o), for any γ > 1, with probability going to
1 as n goes to infinity, the total number of offers made by individuals under DA is smaller
than γn log(n).
Proof. We start from the version of the DA mechanism as defined in McVitie and
Wilson (1971). By the principle of deferred decisions, we assume that whenever an indi-
vidual has an opportunity to make an offer, he makes his offer randomly to an object to
which he has not yet made any offer. Now, as proposed in Wilson (1972), we modify this
mechanism assuming that agents are memoryless: whenever an agents has an opportunity
to make an offer he makes this offer randomly to an object in O, including those to which
he has already made offers to. For each realization of individuals’ preferences, the outcome
is the same as with memory. Indeed, if an agent makes an offer to an object which already
rejected him, he will continue to be rejected and the final outcome remains unchanged.
The total number of offers when individuals have no memory must be larger than in the
original case where agents have memory. We let X be the total number of offers needed for
all objects in O to be matched under the mechanism where agents are memoryless. Given
that γ > 1, it is enough to show that Pr(X ≥ γn log(n)) ≤ 1
nγ−1
. For any particular object
o ∈ O, the probability that o receives no offer by time γn log(n) offers are made in McVitie









≤ e−(γ log(n)) = 1
nγ
(S0)
where the first term is the probability that all the first γn log(n) offers have been directed
to objects other than o.
Next observe that the algorithm ends (and the assignment is complete) once every object
receives at least one offer. Hence, the probability that X ≥ γn log(n) is the probability
that the algorithm (with memorlyess agents) is not complete after n log(n) offers have been
made, which in turn equals the probability that at least one object has not received an offer
by the time n log(n) total offers have been made. By the union bound and using Equation





14At each stage of the algorithm, there is an individual who is rejected (the identity of the individual
may depend on objects’ priorities but his identity does not matter for our computations) and, using the
principle of deferred decisions and the fact that individuals are memoryless, this individual makes an offer
randomly to an object in O.
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In the sequel, for each size of the market n, we let j(n) and κ(n) be the two parameters
of DACB. The following result is a straightforward implication of the above lemma.
Corollary S3. Consider any arbitrary objects’ priorities. In the case individuals’ prefer-
ences are uncorrelated, if lim infn→∞
j(n)κ(n)
n log(n)
> 1 then under DA we must have
Pr {fewer than j(n) agents make more than κ(n) offers} → 1
as n→∞.
Proof. Proceed by contradiction and assume that there is δ > 0 and a sequence
nk →∞ as k →∞ such that along that sequence
Pr {more than j(nk) individuals make more than κ(nk) offers} > δ.
This implies that along the sequence {nk}, there is a probability greater than δ > 0 that




> 1, we must have that for some γ > 1 and for nk large enough,
j(nk)κ(nk) > γnk log(nk). Hence, we obtain that along the sequence {nk}, there is a
probability greater than δ > 0 that the total number of offers made under DA is strictly
greater than γnk log(nk) which yields a contradiction. 
In the sequel we fix the two parameters of the DACB mechanism to be j(n) and κ(n).
Theorem 6 directly follows from the proposition below.
Proposition S2. Fix any k ≥ 1. As n→∞, with probability approaching one, at the end
of Stage k of DACB, all objects in Ok are assigned and at most j(n) objects outside Ok are
assigned. In addition, for any ε > 0
|{i ∈ Îk|Ui(DACB(i)) ≥ U(uk, 1)− ε}|
|Îk|
p−→ 1
where Îk is the set of individuals matched at Stage k of DACB. Similarly,
|{o ∈ Ôk|Vo(DACB(o)) ≥ V (1)− ε}|
|Ôk|
p−→ 1
where Ôk is the set of objects matched at Stage k of DACB.
Proof of Proposition S2. We focus on Stage k = 1, as will become clear, the
other cases can be treated in a similar way.
First, consider the submarket that consists of the |O1| first agents (according to the
ordering given in the definition of DACB) and of all objects in O1 objects. If we were
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to run standard DA just for this submarket, then because preferences are drawn iid, by
Lemma 2 and Corollary S3, with probability approaching 1 as n → ∞ , at the end of
(standard) DA, (a) all agents have made fewer than log2(|O1|) ≤ log2(n) offers and (b)
fewer than j(|O1|) ≤ j(n) individuals have made more than κ(|O1|) ≤ κ(n) offers.
Consider now the original market. For any δ > 0, since k(n) = o(n), we must have
that k(n) ≤ δ |O1| for any n large enough. Hence, by Lemma 3-(ii) the event that for
each agent’s max{κ(n), log2(n)} favorite objects are in O1 has probability approaching 1
as n→∞. Let us condition on this event, labeled E .
We now show that, conditional on E , with probability approaching 1 as n → ∞, all
objects in O1 and no more than j(n) objects outside O1 are assigned by the end of Stage 1.
Note that under our conditioning event E , the distribution of individuals’ preferences over
objects in O1 is the same as the unconditional one (and the same is true for the distribution
of objects’ priorities over individuals). Given event E , as long as each agent has made fewer
than log2(n) offers (which ensures that offers are only made to O1 objects) and fewer than
j(n) individuals have made more than κ(n) offers (which ensures that the end of Stage 1 is
not triggered), the |O1| first steps of DACB proceed exactly in the same way as DA in the
submarket composed of the |O1| first agents (according to the ordering used in DACB) and
of all objects in O1. Hence, as mentioned above, with probability going to 1 as n → ∞,
we then reach the end of Step |O1| of DACB before Stage 1 ends (i.e., before more than
j(n) individuals applied to their κ(n) most favorite object). Hence, conditional on E , with
probability going to 1, all objects in O1 are assigned before Stage 1 ends. In addition,
under event E , if more than j(n) individuals make offers to objects outside O1 before Stage
1 ends, then more than j(n) individuals make more than κ(n) = o(n) offers which is not
possible by definition of a stage in DACB. Hence, under event E , Stage 1 must end before
more than j(n) objects outside O1 are assigned. Now, since Pr(E) → 1 as n → ∞, we
obtain that at the end of stage 1 of DACB, all objects in O1 are assigned and at most j(n)
objects outside O1 are assigned with probability going to 1. This completes the proof of
the first part of Proposition S2.
Now, we move to the proof of the second part of Proposition S2. We fix any ε > 0 and
γ < 1 and want to show that as n→∞,
Pr
{













In the sequel, we condition on event E . Recall that, with probability going to 1, the number
of individuals matched in Stage 1 is between |O1|+1 and |O1|+j(n) and all these individuals
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except possibly for j(n) of them obtain an object within their κ(n) most favorite objects.
By Lemma 3-(i) this implies that, with probability going to 1, all these individuals but
potentially j(n) = o(n) of them enjoy a payoff above U(u1, 1)− ε. As we have shown, with
probability going to 1, the first |O1| Steps of Stage 1 of DACB proceed exactly in the same
way as DA in the submarket that consists of the |O1| first agents (according to the ordering
used in DACB) and of all objects in O1. We first note that, by Lemma 2, under DA in this
submarket, with probability going to 1 the proportion of objects in O1 with a rank smaller
than 2
1−γ |O1|/ log(|O1|) is larger than γ. To see this, suppose to the contrary that with
probability bounded away from 0, as the market grows, the proportion of objects with a rank
above 2
1−γ |O1|/ log(|O1|) is more than 1−γ. Then, with probability bounded away from 0, as








1−γ (|O1|/ log(|O1|)) = 2|O1|/ log(|O1|)
which yields a contradiction to Lemma 2. Hence, we obtain that with probability going
to 1 by the end of Step |O1| of Stage 1 of DACB, the proportion of objects in O1 with a
rank smaller than 2
1−γ |O1|/ log(|O1|) is larger than γ. Given that for any δ > 0, for n large
enough, |O1|/ log(|O1|) ≤ δ |I|, by Lemma 3-(iii), we must also have that, with probability
going to 1, the proportion of objects o in O1 with V (DACB(o)) ≥ 1− ε is above γ. Since
objects in O1 will have received even more offers at the end of Stage 1, it must still be that,
with probability going to 1, the proportion of objects in O1 for which V (DACB(o)) ≥ 1−ε
is above γ when n is large enough. We ignore the remaining objects matched in Stage 1
since there are fewer than j(n) = o(n) such objects. Thus, for k = 1, the second statement
in Proposition S2 is proved provided that our conditioning event E holds. Since, this event
has probability going to 1 as n→∞, the result must hold even without the conditioning.
Thus, we have proved Proposition S2 for the case k = 1.
Consider next Stage k > 1. The objects remaining in Stage k have received no offers in
Stages 1, ..., k − 1 (or else the objects would have been assigned in those stages). Hence,
by the principle of deferred decisions, we can assume that the individuals’ preferences over
those objects are yet to be drawn in the beginning of Stage k. Similarly, we can assume
that priorities of those objects are also yet to be drawn. Put in another way, conditional
on Stage k − 1 being over, we can assume without loss that the distribution of preferences
and priorities is the same as the unconditional one. Thus, we can consider the market
composed of the individuals and objects not matched in previous stages. We can set O1
to be equal to the set of remaining objects in Ok, O2 to be equal to the set of remaining
objects in Ok+1, etc... (with high probability, the cardinality of each tier defined in this
way is linear in n, i.e., between |O`| − (` − 1)j(n) and |O`| for each `) so the exact same
reasoning as above completes the argument. 
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S.6.2 Incentives under the Extended Algorithm
In the sequel, we consider the extended version of DACB with parameters j(n) and κ(n).
We first slightly strengthen our assumption that the serial orders admit some basic uncer-
tainty from the agents’ perspective: for each sequence of sets En ⊂ {1, . . . , n} such that
lim |En|/n goes to 0 as n goes to infinity, we assume that the probability that any agent i
receives a serial order in En goes to zero as n→∞.
We show that the following result.




j(n) and κ(n) are o(n). Fix any ε > 0. Under DACB, there exists N > 0 such that for all
n > N , truthtelling is an interim ε-Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
The proof is rather similar to that of Theorem 5. The two main lemmas (Lemmas S4
and S3) from the proof of Theorem 5 have to be adapted. The rest of the proof is in essence
the same and is thus omitted.
Let us fix ε > 0 and k = 1, ..., K. Assume that the ordering of DACB gives to agent i
a serial order in {|O≤k−1|+ 1 + j(n), ..., |O≤k|} with the convention that |O≤0|+ 1 + j(n) =
1. We show that there is N ≥ 1 such that for any n ≥ N , for any vector of cardinal
utilities (ûo)o∈O := (Ui(uo, ξio))o∈O, i cannot gain more than ε by deviating given that
everyone else reports truthfully. As will be clear, the argument does not depend on the
specific serial order of i within {|O≤k−1| + 1 + j(n), ..., |O≤k|} and so given that there are
finitely many tiers, N can be taken to be uniform across all individuals with serial order in
∪Kk=1{|O≤k−1|+ 1 + j(n), ..., |O≤k|}. Hence, conditional on the event that i’s serial order is
in {|O≤k−1|+1+j(n), ..., |O≤k|} for some k = 1, ..., K, it will follow that for any n ≥ N , for
any vector of cardinal utilities, i cannot gain more than ε by deviating given that everyone
else reports truthfully. Now, given our assumption on the distribution from which the
ordering of DACB is drawn, the probability of the conditioning event goes to 1. Hence,
for any n ≥ N , for any vector of cardinal utilities (ûo)o∈O := (Ui(uo, ξio))o∈O, i cannot gain
more than ε by deviating given that everyone else reports truthfully – which shows the
desired result.
Lemma S6. Let us assume that lim infn→∞
j(n)κ(n)
n log(n)
> 1. Consider the DACB mechanism.
Fix any k = 1, . . . , K and any agent i with a serial order in {|O≤k−1|+ 1 + j(n), ..., |O≤k|}.
Assuming all agents report truthfully, the probability that i is matched at Stage k to one of
his κ most favorite choices within remaining objects at that stage converges to 1 as n→∞.
Proof. By the argument in the proof of Proposition S2, we know that with probability
approaching 1 as n goes to infinity, Step |O≤k| ends under DACB15 and, for any agent i
15Here, when counting the number of steps which occurred by the end of Stage k, we consider the total
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with a serial order in {|O≤k−1| + 1 + j(n), ..., |O≤k|}, the outcome of DACB at the end
of that step coincides with that of DA in the submarket composed only of remaining
individuals at that stage with a serial order below |O≤k| (which contains all individuals
with serial order in {|O≤k−1|+ 1 + j(n), ..., |O≤k|}) and the remaining objects in Ok. Since
the outcome of DA does not depend on the specific linear order used, under the event
that the outcome of DACB at the end of Step |O≤k| coincide with that of DA in that
submarket, if we switch the ordering (of the linear order of DACB) of agents with serial
order in {|O≤k−1| + j(n) + 1, ..., |O≤k|} the outcome of DACB at Step |O≤k| remains the
same and so the final outcome of DACB remains the same. Thus, conditional on this event,
for each agent with a serial order in {|O≤k−1|+ j(n) + 1, ..., |O≤k|}, the probability of either
not being matched by the end of Stage k or of being one of the j(n) individuals making
more than κ offers is the same. Hence, since the number of such agents goes to infinity as
n grows, this probability must go to 0 as n goes to infinity. Since the conditional event has
a probability converging to 1 as n goes to infinity, (unconditionally) this probability must
go to 0 as n goes to infinity. 
In the sequel, we let Ô≥k be the set of available objects in Stage k. Note that this does
not depend on i’s reports (given that i’s serial order is in {|O≤k−1|+1+j(n), ..., |O≤k|}). We
assume that all individuals other than i report truthfully their preferences. We partition
the set of i’s possible reports into two sets T1 and T2 as follows. T1 consists of the set of
i’s reports that, when restricted to objects in Ô≥k, only contain objects in Ok within the κ
first objects. T2 consists of the set of i’s reports which, when restricted to objects in Ô≥k,
contain some object outside Ok within the κ first objects.
We will again be using the following terminology: Fix a set of possible reports T . Given
an event EPi which may depend on i’s report Pi, we will say that the probability of EPi
converges to 1 uniformly across all reports in T if for any ε > 0, there is N such that for
any n ≥ N , Pr(EPi) ≥ 1− ε for any report Pi in T .
Recall that i’s serial order is in {|O≤k−1| + 1 + j(n), ..., |O≤k|}. In the sequel, given
agent i’s report, we define p(r) to be the probability of obtaining the r-th ranked object
within the Ô≥k objects (we abuse notations and forget about the dependence of p(r) on i’s
report).
Lemma S7. If i’s report is of type T1, then
∑κ
k=1 p(k) converges to 1. In addition, the
convergence is uniform across all possible reports in T1. If i’s report is of type T2, then∑`
k=1 p(k) converges to 1 where ` ≤ κ is the rank (within the Ô≥k objects) of the first object
outside Ok. In addition, the convergence is uniform across all possible reports in T2.16
number of steps from the beginning of Stage 1. Hence, we say that Step |O≤k| of Stage k ends if, from the
beginning of Stage 1, |O≤k| steps have occurred.
16More precisely, we mean that for any ε > 0, there is N such that for any n ≥ N ,
∑`
k=1 p(k) ≥ 1 − ε
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Proof. Consider E the event under which, independently of i’s reported preferences,
provided that all individuals from 1 to |O≤k−1|+j(n) report truthfully their preferences, for
each k′ = 1, ..., k − 1, the objects assigned in Stage k′ contain all those in Ok′ and contain
no more than j(n) objects from O>k′ . By our argument in the proof of Proposition 1, the
probability of this event tends to 1. By construction, the convergence is uniform over all
of i’s possible reports. From now on, let us condition on the realization of event E . By
Lemma S6, we know that with (conditional) probability going to 1 as n → ∞, i makes
fewer than κ offers and is matched within Stage k. In addition, by ex ante symmetry of
objects within a given tier (given our conditioning event E , the way i ranks objects in O≤k−1
does not matter), the rate at which the conditional probability goes to 1 is the same for
each report in T1. But given that Pr(E) goes to 1 uniformly across all possible i’s reports,
the unconditional probability that i is matched within Stage k to an object within his κ
most favorite in Ô≥k also converges to 1 uniformly across these reports. This proves the
first part of the lemma.
We next move to the proof of the second part of the lemma. Let us consider the event
that for each k′ = 1, ..., K, all individuals other than i only rank objects in Ok′ within their
κ most favorite objects in Ô≥k′ (recall that with probability approaching 1 as n goes to
infinity, the size of Ô≥k′ ∩ Ok′ is linear in n). Consider as well event E as defined above
and let F be the intersection of these two events. By Lemma 3-(ii) as well as Proposition
1, we know that Pr(F) goes to 1 as n goes to infinity. By construction, the convergence
is uniform over all of i’s possible reports. Note that under event F no individual other
than i will make an offer to an object outside Ok within Stage k. In addition, under F , the
probability that i is matched in Stage k and obtains an object with his κ most favorite with
remaining objects goes to 1 as n goes to infinity uniformly across any report of i in T2.17
Combining these observations, it must be the case that the probability that “i is matched to
the object outside Ok with rank ` or to a better object” converges to 1 uniformly across all
for any ` ≤ κ and for any report of i which, restricted to objects in O≥k contains an object outside Ok at
rank ` (where the rank is within objects in O≥k).
17 Indeed, the probability that i gets matched in Stage k to one of his κ most favorite object in Ô≥k
under a report in T2 is larger than the probability that i gets matched in Stage k to one of his κ most
favorite object in Ô≥k under the report where within the κ first objects in Ô≥k, any object outside Ok
is replaced by an object in Ok. To see this, let ` be the rank (within Ô≥k) of the first object outside Ok
under the original report. Observe that under F , i cannot get matched to an object in a tier k′ < k.
In addition, if under the modified report, i gets matched to an object with a rank (within Ô≥k) strictly
smaller than ` then, by definition of DACB, i will obtain the same match under the original report. Now,
if i gets matched to an object with a rank (within Ô≥k) in {`, . . . , κ} then, under the original report, i
applies to an object in O>k and so, under F , by definition of DACB, i gets matched to that object. Since
the modified report is in T1, and, as we already showed, the probability that i is matched in Stage k to
one of his κ most favorite object in Ô≥k goes to 1 as n goes to infinity uniformly across any report of i in
T1, this completes our argument.
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possible i’ reports in T2. In addition, we know that under F , agent i can only be matched
to an object in Ô≥k, hence,
∑`
k=1 p(k) converges to 1 uniformly across i’s possible reports.
Given that Pr(F) goes to 1 uniformly across all possible i’s reports, this statement holds
for unconditional probabilities as well, as was to be shown. 
S.7 Simulation Based on Randomly Generated Data
.
Our analytical results in the paper are obtained in a limit market as n → ∞, and one
concern could be their validity for realistic markets, with large but finite participants. Our
calibration work based on the NYC School Choice data already suggests that the DACB
would work well in the field, such as in NYC school choice, offering a range of compromises
between the two objectives superior to the simple convexification of DA and TTC. But
what about smaller markets? To test the robustness of our results to market size, we
performed a number of simulations to see how alternative mechanisms would work under
market with different number of participants.
S.7.1 Varying Market Sizes
Assume that U(uo, ξi,o) = uo + ξi,o and V (ηi,o) = ηi,o, and that each of uo, ξi,o and ηi,o are
distributed uniformly from [0, 1].18 We later change the support of uo to [0, 3] to investigate
the impact of increased correlation in agents’ preferences. For the case of DACB, we set
κ(n) = log2(n) throughout.
Figure 1 shows the utilitarian welfare—more precisely the average idiosyncratic utility
enjoyed by the agents—under the alternative algorithms for the varying market size ranging
from n = 10 to 10, 000.19
As expected, the TTC achieves higher utilitarian welfare, followed by DACB, and DA,
and they all increase with the market size. But the levels of the utilitarian welfare as
well as the rates at which the welfare increase with the market size differ across different
mechanisms in a significant way. The efficiency of DACB rises quickly with market size,
reaching 90% for n = 1, 000, and above 96% for n = 10, 000. By contrast, the efficiency
18We also performed several simulations in which the common values are distributed over two values,
as would be in the two tier case. The simulations outcomes in this case are largely similar to the ones
reported here.
19The mechanisms were simulated under varying number of random drawings of the idiosyn-
cratic and common utilities: 1000, 1000, 500, 500, 200, 200, 100, 100, 20, 10 for the market sizes n =
10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1, 000, 2, 000, 5, 000, 10, 000.
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Figure 1: Utilitarian welfare under alternative mechanisms
ratio is fairly steady around 80-81% for DA, regardless of the size. As n rises in the range
1, 000 ≤ n ≤ 10, 000, the DACB’s gap relative to TTC narrows to 3%, while its gap
relative to DA widens to 15%. This result shows that DACB performs well in efficiency
even for relatively small markets. Figure 2 shows the fraction of ε-blocking pairs under
DA, DACB and TTC. Clearly, DA admits no blocking pairs, so the fraction is always zero.
Between TTC and DACB, there is a substantial difference. Blocking pairs admitted by
TTC comprise almost 9% of all possible pairs, whereas DACB admits blocking pairs that
are less than 1% of all possible pairs, and these proportions do not vary much with the
market size. This result is consistent with our calibration result showing that the number
of blocking pairs shrinks dramatically when the mechanism is shifted from TTC to DACB.
When we weaken the notion of stability to ε−stability, focusing only on the pairs of the
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Figure 2: The fraction of ε-blocking pairs under alternative mechanisms with ε = 0 (left
panel) and ε = 0.05 (right panel)
agent and object that would benefit from blocking more than ε percentile improvement
in rankings, the fractions decline (not surprisingly), but the differences between the two
mechanisms remain significant. Under ε = 0.05, the fractions of ε−blocking pairs are around
7% for TTC, but the fraction is close to zero under DACB, again largely irrespective of the
market size. These results are consistent with the earlier calibration results showing that
the number of blocking pairs decrease dramatically when we shift from TTC to DACB.
S.7.2 Many-to-one matching with varying κ
Recall our analysis focuses on one-to-one matching. In order to test the robustness of our
results to a realistic many-to-one matching setting, we consider a model in which 100,000
students are to be assigned to 500 schools each with 200 seats. We assume that common
and idiosyncratic values are both drawn uniformly from [0, 1]. We simulate DACB under
a variety of values of κ’s. Figure 3 shows the sense in which DACB with different κ’s span
different ways to compromise on efficiency (left panel) and stability (right panel). For a
low value of κ, DACB performs similarly to TTC, attaining about 97.5% of the utilitarian
welfare upper bound and admitting about 18% of blocking pairs, whereas DA attains close
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Figure 3: Utilitarian welfare (left panel) and the fraction of 0-blocking pairs (right panel)
under DACB with varying κ’s
to 80% of the utilitarian welfare upper bound. For a low κ, DACB resembles TTC with
high welfare and high incidences of blocking pairs. As κ rises, the utilitarian welfare under
DACB falls, but the number of blocking pairs declines as well.
In practice, the value of κ can be chosen to attain a good compromise between utilitarian
efficiency and stability. For instance, DACB with κ = 35 keeps the utilitarian welfare still
very high at 97% but the proportion of blocking pairs below 10%. For DACB with κ = 70,
the utilitarian welfare remains still high at 95% but the fraction of blocking pairs drops
down to almost 5%.
The “right” value of κ will of course depend on the precise preference structure as
well as the allowable margin for violations of the exact objectives—i.e., the values of ε’s
in ε-efficiency and ε-stability. To illustrate, Figure 4 below shows again the performances
of DACB with different κ’s, when the common values are drawn uniformly from [0, 1/2]
(idiosyncratic values are still drawn uniformly from [0, 1]). DACB with κ = 15 attains
97% of the utilitarian welfare upper bound at admits less than 5% of ε-blocking pairs for
ε = 0.05.
31
























































































Figure 4: Utilitarian welfare (left panel) and the fraction of 0.05-blocking pairs (right panel)
under DACB with varying κ’s
S.7.3 Correlated Priorities
Lee and Yariv (2014) show that any stable matching (and thus DA) is asymptotically
efficient if agents’ priorities have common component that is drawn from a non-degenerate
interval according to an absolutely continuous distribution function. To see how DACB
compares with DA under this environment, we performed several simulations under the
assumption that agent i’s priority at object o is given by V (vi, ηi,o) = vi + ηi,o, where both
vi and ηi,o are each uniformly distributed from [0, 1]. As before, we assume that agent’s
preference is given by U(uo, ξi,o) = uo + ξi,owhere ξi,o is distributed uniformly from [0, 1],
and uo is uniform on [0, 1] or [0, 3]. In keeping with Sections 6 and 7 in the paper, when
we run DACB in this environment, the serial orders of the agents are determined based on
their average priorities, i.e., the agent with the best average priority gets the first position
in the serial order, the one with the second average priority gets the second, and so on.
Hence, the name priority-based (PB) DACB.
Figure 5 compares utilitarian welfare under DA, DACB and TTC when uo is uniform
on [0, 1].
As can be seen, the TTC performs best, followed by DACB, which performs in turn
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Figure 5: Utilitarian welfare under correlated priorities; uo uniform on [0, 1]
better than DA. While both DA and DACB attain higher welfare as the size of the market
increases, one can see that the difference between the two is significant for a reasonable
market size.
Figure 6 shows the same comparison when uo is uniform on [0, 3]. This change simply
means that agents’ preferences exhibit higher correlation than before. Hence, as discussed
in the text, this case implicitly involves market imbalance and excessive competition toward
high quality objects. In light of our result in Section 4.0.2 and Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno
(2013), one would expect the gap between DACB and DA to widen in this case. This is
indeed what we see here.
Last, Figures 7 and 8 compare the number of blocking pairs under alternative mecha-
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Figure 6: Utilitarian welfare under correlated priorities; uo uniform on [0, 3]
nisms in this environment.
Compared with the case without correlation (see Figure 2), the fraction of blocking
pairs under TTC is significantly lower (close to 3-6% as opposed to 10% in Figure 2).
The reason for this is that the agents assigned in early rounds of TTC tend to have high
priorities even when they are assigned via long cycles, unlike the case of uncorrelated
priorities. Nevertheless, the fraction of blocking pairs does not fall as the market grows
large. This fact suggests that the asymptotic instability we find in Section 4.0.1 is robust
to the introduction of correlated priorities. By contrast, the PB DACB eliminates almost
all blocking pairs; the fraction of blocking pairs hovers around 1%.
The simulations show that the results obtained in the paper hold broadly in terms of
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Figure 7: Number of blocking pairs under correlated priorities; uo uniform on [0, 1]
the market sizes and in terms of the distribution of the common values.
S.8 NYC Public High School Choice and the Associ-
ated Data Set
S.8.1 Institutional elements on how NYC actual system operates
The possibility to choose schools has a long history in New-York City. For instance, selective
high schools appeared in the early 20th schools. The current system established by the
Bloomberg administration started in 2004 and is the most highly centralized that the city
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Figure 8: Number of blocking pairs under correlated priorities; uo uniform on [0, 3]
has ever known.20 In this section, we only provide a brief description of the procedure
and refer to Corcoran and Levin (2011) or Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth (2009) for
further descriptions. Each fall, about 90,000 students apply to enter a high school in New-
York City in the following year. Most of them are 8th graders.21 NYC has over 700 school
20It replaced a system where students could submit at most five choices outside of their zone or attend
their zoned schools if any. Under this old system, schools offers were uncoordinated so that some students
received multiple offers while a large fraction of students received no offers. After the main round of
assignment more than a third of students were left with no assignment and ultimately got administratively
assigned. See Abdulkadiroglu, Agarwal, and Pathak (2015).
21A small fraction of the students are 9th graders. Those are mainly coming from junior high schools
including 9th grade.
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programs.22 There are seven types of “admission methods” which determine how a program
orders students by priorities. As we will see, these priorities are often weak, causing a set of
students to fall in the same priority class. In order to resolve these indeterminacies, a single
tie-breaking rule is used: at the beginning of the process, a single random number is assigned
to each student. Whenever necessary this number is used to break an indeterminacy in the
priorities of a program. We now describe these seven admission methods.
Unscreened programs do not rank students at all, i.e., all students are in the same
priority class. Zoned school programs give priority to students who live within a pre-
defined zone area (some students can have no zoned program). For these two programs,
there is no evaluation by schools of students. However, the other five programs, to some
extent, evaluate students’ abilities in some way or condition their priorities to the interest
students show in attending the school. For instance, for limited unscreened programs,
all else being equal, students’ who attended an information session or visit the school’s
exhibit at high school fairs or open houses will have a higher priority. Similarly, Screened
programs (all else equal) assign higher priority to students based on several criteria such
as their 7th grade report card, reading and math standardized scores, attendance and
punctuality, interview, essay or additional diagnostic tests. Audition programs partly base
their priorities on auditions aimed at evaluating their proficiency in specific performing of
visual arts, music, or dance. Educational option programs target a distribution in terms
of reading ability measured by their score on the 7th grade standardized reading test.
If possible, 16% of seats are assigned high performing, 68% middle performing students
and the 16% remaining are assigned low performing students. Moreover, for half of their
seats, educational programs can actively rank students (while still respecting the target
distribution) as screened schools do. For the other half, the random tie-breaking rule is
used subject to the distributional constraint.23 In addition, the system ensures admission to
an educational option program for students within the top 2 percent on the seventh grade
22One special feature of NYC is that one school can offer several school programs. Indeed, there are
about 400 high schools housing these programs. Students apply to programs, and the programs within the
same high school can be very distinct. Hence, for our purpose, the relevant unit to focus on is the program.
23 More precisely, each educational option program is splitted into six separate programs: LR, LS, MR,
MS, HR, HS where L, M and H stand for low, middle or high achievement (in the reading test) while R
and H stand for random and select. For a given educational option program, 50%×16% of the seats are for
LR, 50%×68% are for MR and 50%×16% HR. Similarly, 50%×16% of the seats are for LS, 50%×68% are
for MS and 50%×16% HS. For these “virtual subprograms”, high-level students are ranked above middle-
and low-level students at HS/HR, middle-level students are ranked above high- and low-level students at
MS/MR, and low-level students are ranked above high- and middle-level students at LS/LR. Within each
class the selection process depends on whether the virtual subprogram is select (S) or random (R). For
select subprograms, the selection within a category is similar to that of a screened programs. For random
subprograms, the single random number is used to break ties.
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standardized reading test provided that this program is top ranked. Finally, specialized
high school programs have a special status. Students willing to apply to these schools have
to pass the Specialized High School Admission Test (SHSAT). Students’ priorities in these
schools are purely determined by their SHSAT score.24
In the summer following seventh grade, families are encouraged to review the Direc-
tory of the NYC Public High Schools published by the Department of Education. This
document provides information on schools’ locations, contact information, enrollment, aca-
demic performances along with details on how priorities are set. In the fall, students who
are interested in entering a specialized high school program have to pass the SHSAT test.
Programs requiring auditions and interviews conduct them during the fall semester as well.
Early December, students have to participate in the first round. In that round, students
have to submit a list of up to twelve school programs by order of preferences. Students
who passed the SHSAT test are allowed to submit an additional list of specialized school
programs ordered by preferences.25 The DA (student proposing) mechanism is used to
produce the assignment.26 In March, students receiving an offer from a specialized pro-
gram (hence, who passed the SHSAT test) are informed of that offer together with the
additional offer (if any) they may have received from a non-specialized program. They are
asked to pick one of the two offers. Students who did not get any offer in round 1 or did
not participate in round 1 go through a second round (sometimes referred to as the main
round). These students submit a rank ordered list of up to twelve schools.27 Capacities
of schools are adjusted based on the decisions made by the students assigned in the first
round. The same algorithm is used to assign students. The vast majority of students is
assigned in that round. However, if a student is unassigned, there is a third round in April
where this student can again submit a new set of up to twelve choices among remaining
school programs. In this third round a random serial dictatorship is used to assign stu-
dents. In case a student is still unmatched he will be assigned a school as close as possible
to his residence. In addition, if there are sufficient grounds, a student may appeal in May.
Finally, students who were not present for this high school admission process have to meet
with an admissions counselor at the enrollment office in order to get assigned a high school.
This last round is usually referred to as over-the-counter.28
24Only a small fraction of seats at these schools are opened to disadvantaged students who performed
well at the SHSAT but who were below the cut-off score for acceptance.
25There are nine specialized high school programs in NYC.
26To handle the target distribution of Educational Option programs (see footnote 23), the rank order
list of a student who applies to such a program is modified to rank the six “virtual” subprograms according
to the order HR, HS, MR, MS, LR, LS.
27See for details on the second round application process.
28The number of such students is surprisingly large (around 36,000 every year). These are among the
school system’s highest-needs students. See Arvidsson, Fruchter, and Mokhtar (2013)
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S.8.2 Data sets
The NYC Department of Education (DOE) provided us with several data sets. We used a
file for academic year 2009-2010 which for each round (round 1, 2 and 3), contains the rank
order list of students who participated in that round as well as the assignment achieved
at the end of the round. In addition to this, for each school program that a student
ranks, the file provides information on the priority of the student at that school. Thus, we
can reconstruct each school program’s priorities (at least over students who ranked that
program) – see next section for additional details. We focused on the main round (i.e.,
second round) of the admission process. In this round we have 78,112 students (out of
83,127 total participants) and 652 school programs.
The information about each program’s capacity is not available. In order to estimate
the capacities of a school, we used the enrollments through Rounds 2 and 3 at that school.
We also observed that some seats are released in the third round: some schools rejecting
students in the second round have some additional available seats in the third round.
Hence, we also tested the robustness of our results using the following alternative strategy
to estimate capacities: if in Round 2 a school program rejects a student then this must
mean that the enrollment at Round 2 at that school is equal to its capacity in that round.
In such a case, the alternative approach sets the capacity to be equal to the enrollment in
Round 2. For other school programs, capacities were still set to their enrollments through
Rounds 2 and 3.29 It turns out that this different way of estimating does not result in a
significant difference in analysis.30
S.8.3 Assumptions on how the NYC system operates and strate-
gies to complete missing data
Priorities. For each school program that a student ranks, the student is assigned a priority
group and a priority rank. These two numbers are meant to allow us to reconstruct each
school program’s priorities. Priority group specifies coarse equivalent classes. Students with
small priority groups numbers always have higher priority than students with larger ones.
29 There are only small number of programs in the latter category.
30Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth (2009) use the final fall enrollments as estimates of capacities.
However, these figures include a sizable number of students who are admitted through the over-the-counter
round. Evidently, the seats for these applicants are created during this administrative assignment process
and they are not available during Round 2 assignment; many programs who reject some applicants in
Round 2 end up admitting students in administrative assignment. Given this, the fall enrollments would
over-estimate the capacities used for the Round 2 assignment. We believe that the qualitative nature of
the comparison of alternative matching algorithms performed here and also in Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak,
and Roth (2009) is robust to alternative methods of estimating capacities.
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Within each coarse priority class so defined, whenever available, the priority rank number is
used to further discriminate between students’ priorities. This lexicographic order between
priority group and priority rank is (based on the explanation by Department of Education
staff) the alleged procedure.31
As mentioned in the paper, an applicant’s priority is observed in the current data set
only for the programs he lists in his rank order list (ROL). The missing priority information
for programs not listed in ROL does not cause any issue for the implementation of DA or
DACB (the way the priorities of students are set at schools they find unacceptable has no
impact on the final assignment). However, it presents some issues with calibrating TTC.
Indeed, under standard TTC, a student may be able to trade a seat of a school at which
he has a high priority – even though he may find that school unacceptable – with a seat at
a school that he likes (but where his priority may be low). Here we assume that programs
not listed in an applicant’s ROL assign a lower priority to that student than those who
listed them in their ROL’s. This treatment potentially understates both the efficiency
benefit as well as the incidence of justified envy associated with TTC. Nevertheless, the
outcome is broadly in line with alternative efficient mechanisms, for which this issue does
not arise, such as that of TTC that allow the agents to trade their DA assignments (i.e.,
Gale’s original top trading cycle with an initial assignment given by DA). In particular, this
does not appear to be a significant issue for the use of TTC as a benchmark for evaluating
DACB’s.
Reported Preferences. Following the existing literature, we assume that the ob-
served ROLs of the applicants are their truthful preference ranking of top programs. This
assumption is not entirely innocuous since the strategyproofness of DA does not apply
when the applicants’ ROLs are truncated (see Haeringer and Klijn (2009)). Nevertheless,
about 80% of the participants did not fill up their ROLs, suggesting that the truncation
was not a binding constraint. However, interpreting the programs not ranked in ROL of an
applicant as unacceptable is not well justified since many applicants unassigned in Round
2 listed additional programs (not in their original ROLs) in the third round.32 This issue
results in overstatement of the efficiency performance of DA in our calibration. At the
same time, that the same assumption is adopted by Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth
31We do note, however, that there are incidences of these lexicographic rule being violated. The inci-
dences comprise a rather small fraction. For instance, there are 2645 students who see their priority group
number violated, i.e. who are rejected from a school program while others with higher priority group
number are accepted; and 4051 students who see their priority group number violated or are rejected from
a school program while others with a same priority group number and a higher priority rank are accepted.
In any case, the priority rule serves our purpose, which is to consider a realistic market setting.
32 About 5000 of them listed additional programs in Round 3 which they did not list in Round 2 ROL,
contradicting the hypothesis that applicants find programs they did not rank in ROL unacceptable.
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(2009) makes our result more easily comparable to theirs. Finally, as pointed out by Ab-
dulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth (2009), the system does not give incentives to students
who scored within the top 2 percent on the seventh grade standardized reading test to
report truthfully their preferences. Since these only represent a small fraction of our set
of students (a lot of them are actually matched in the first round: only 400 remain in the
second round), following Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth (2009) and Abdulkadiroglu,
Agarwal, and Pathak (2015), we excluded all such students (i.e., who both scored within
the top 2 percent of the reading test and ranked an educational option school at the top
of their list) who remain in the main round when we ran our algorithms.
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